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I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called Fabre/Messmer' line of cases constitutes perhaps the
most poorly reasoned and politically biased decisions in Florida jurisprudence. In these cases, Florida courts seem to abandon fundamental
principles of fairness which provide that only those who are given fair
notice and opportunity to respond can be legally blamed for a wrongful act.
The following article outlines both the Fabre and Messmer decisions, and
analyzes those decisions from the defense and plaintiff perspectives. Next,
the article surveys subsequent decisions. It notes the impact of these cases
on our judicial system and the probable resulting negative public perception
of the judicial system's ability to be fair and just.

II.

PRECEDENT FLORIDA CASES

A. Messmer Came First
The first in this historic line of cases was decided by the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Co.2 That case arose
out of a car crash in which the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by
her husband. The defendant truck driver was uninsured, but the plaintiff had
uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $300,000. The uninsured
by the terms of the
motorist claim was submitted to arbitration as required
3
Teacher's Insurance Company ("Teacher's") policy.
The arbitrators found that the defendant was 20% responsible for
causing the accident. They awarded the plaintiff total economic damages
in the amount of $52,455, and total noneconomic damages in the amount of
$200,000. 4 Plaintiffs husband was not a party to the lawsuit, either as a
defendant or as a third party defendant, under Florida's then existing law of
contribution.5 The policy, which also insured the husband, contained an
exclusion for liability claims by members of the insured's household, so
there was no liability insurance coverage for plaintiff's injuries caused by
her husband.6 Notwithstanding her husband's absence of liability coverage,

1. Fabre v. Marin, 597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by 623 So.
2d 1182 (Fla. 1993); Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
2. 588 So. 2d at 610.
3. Id. at 611.
4. Id.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(f) (1987).
6. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611 n.1.
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plaintiff's insurance policy did not provide coverage for her husband's
negligence. The trial court's interpretation was affinred.7 The trial court
and the Fifth District Court of Appeal and ultimately the Supreme Court of
Florida failed to follow Florida's well-established rules of statutory
construction.8 There even appears to be an internal conflict within the
court's own holding, when it states that "[tihe use of the word 'party'
simply describes an entity against whom judgement is to be entered." 9 By
its own holding, the court should not have considered plaintiffs husband as

a party, since he was not an entity against whom judgment was or could
have been entered.
Teacher's paid the economic damage award in full, plus costs.10 But
11
the trial court, interpreting Florida's law on apportionment of damages,
ruled that Teacher's only had to pay 20% of noneconomic damages.12 The
appellate court determined that "party" meant party to the incident, rather
than party to the lawsuit. 3 This analysis, that the legislature intended to
equate liability with fault, meant a wrongdoer could and should escape full

7. Id. at 611.
8. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984), stated: "[w]hen the language of a statute
is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given
its plain and obvious meaning." Il.at 219 (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137
So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)). Holly stated that courts in the State of Florida are "without power
to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify or limit, its express
terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of

legislative power." Holly, 450 So. 2d at 219 (quoting American Bankers Life Assur. Co. of
Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968)). But see City of Boca
Raton v. Gidman, 440 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1983) (holding that statutes should be
construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature); State v. Webb,
398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1981) (holding that legislative intent should be given effect
regardless of whether such construction varies from statute's literal meaning).
9. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611.
10. ld.
11. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1987) provides:
(3) APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES. - In cases to which this section applies,
the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such
party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and
several liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of
fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter
judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on the basis of the
doctrine of joint and several liability.
Id.

12. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611.
13. See id
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responsibility to an innocent victim whenever it could share blame upon an
entity absent from the proceedings. Such reasoning was flawed because it
failed to consider Florida's law of contribution 14 in pari materia. Furthermore, the court failed to consider, or perhaps was not provided with, the
argument that the legislative intent in abrogating part of the joint and several
liability doctrine was based upon a belief that well-heeled tortfeasors were
too often footing the bill for other tortfeasors who were parties to the
lawsuit and could not pay their share of the damages.
Nevertheless, Messmer opened the door to allow the apportionment of
liability on the verdict form to people or entities who were not parties to the
lawsuit and were not given a chance to defend themselves by their accusers.
B.

Then There Was Fabre

About seven months after the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided
Messmer, a similar issue came before the Third District Court of Appeal in
Fabre v. Marin.15 In that case, the plaintiff was also a passenger in an
automobile that was hit by another car. As in Messmer, plaintiffs driver
was her husband. The plaintiff alleged that she was injured when the
defendant's car ran plaintiff's car off the road and into a guardrail.
Defendants were underinsured and so plaintiff sued both Fabre and her own
uninsured/underinsured carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company ("State Farm"). The jury found plaintiff's husband 50% liable
and the defendant 50% liable, and awarded total damages of $12,750 for
economic losses and $350,000 for noneconomic losses. 6 The court
entered judgment against both defendants (the Fabres and State Farm) for
the total amount of the damages, $362,750.17 Defendants filed several
post-trial motions, but the salient one was a motion to reduce plaintiff's
recovery by 50%, the amount of fault attributed to the defendants. The trial
court denied the motion. s
The Third District Court of Appeal agreed the case was factually
indistinguishable from Messmer but declined to adopt Messmer's holding. 9
The Fabre I court concluded that section 768.81(3) of the FloridaStatutes
was in fact ambiguous with regard to the meaning of the word "party." The

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See generally FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1987).
597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("FabreI').
Id. at 884-85.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id.
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court noted that the legislature did not define the term, and that the word
could in fact have three possible meanings.2" They declined to adopt the
definition that the word "party" could include non-parties to the lawsuit,
since subsection three of the relevant statute requires the trial court to enter
judgment against liable parties and the court could not have jurisdiction to
enter judgment against non-parties.2"
Although the Messmer and Fabre I courts both applied the same
standards in analyzing their respective cases, the Third District Court of
Appeal considered and applied fundamental rules of statutory construction
to give full force and effect to all statutes whenever possible.22 The Fabre
I court, in an in-depth review, also fully considered the comparative fault
statuteP and the doctrine of interspousal immunity. 4 The court stated
that sections 768.81(2) and 768.81(3) of the FloridaStatutes revealed that
the legislative language consistently reduced claimant's recovery only as a
result of the claimant's own fault.' The FabreI court, unlike the Messmer
court, took into account the history of Florida jurisprudence as well as the
legislative history on the relevant issues.
Importantly, the Fabre I court defined intellectual honesty when it
stated that "[w]hen the meaning of a statute is in doubt, a rational, sensible
construction, avoiding unreasonable consequences, is favored."2' 6 Writing
for a unanimous court, Judge Baskin declined to usurp the legislative
function by adding to the statute, writing: "[i]n the absence of any language
in-subsection three reducing an innocent plaintiff's recovery, and in view of
the statute's express provision of the measure by which to reduce a
negligent claimant's award, we conclude that subsection three should not be
applied to bar Mrs. Marin's recovery." 27 The case was then certified to the
supreme court as being in conflict with Messmer.2 8

20. Fabre I, 597 So. 2d at 885. The word could mean "1) persons involved in an
accident; 2) defendants in a lawsuit; or 3) all litigants in the lawsuit." Id.
21. Id.
22. See generally id. at 885-86.

23. I& (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 768.81(2), (3) (Supp. 1988)).
24. Fabre I, 597 So. 2d at 886.

25. Id at 885.
26. Id. at 886 (citing Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1981) and Radio
Tel. Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Tel. Co., 170 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1964)).
27. IM
28. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

5

Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 14

Nova Law Review
C.

Vol. 20

The Showdown

The Supreme Court of Florida broke the tie on August 26, 1993 in its
review of Fabre v. Marin.29 Writing for the majority, Justice Grimes
reviewed the facts and holdings of both Messmer and Fabre 130 The court
then provided an overview of the historical doctrines of contributory
negligence, joint and several liability, comparative negligence, and
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 3' The court compared Fabre, in
which the plaintiff was entirely innocent, to Walt Disney World Co. v.
Wood.32 In Disney, the jury found the defendant was only 1% negligent,
a non-party to the lawsuit was 85% negligent and, most importantly, the
plaintiff was 14% negligent.33 Thus, the Disney plaintiff was both
negligent and was more negligent than the defendant! However, the Disney
court reasoned that section 768.81 of the FloridaStatutes did not completely
replace the concept of joint and several liability and that judgment should
be entered against each party liable on the basis of that party's fault.34 The
Disney court never considered that Florida's contribution statute35 and third
party practice rule 36 allowed Disney to make the plaintiff's fianc6, the nonparty, a defendant in the case, since it was Disney and not the plaintiff who
felt the fianc6 was at fault. Of course, no one will ever know whether
apportionment would have been the same if Disney, the accuser, had been
required to openly name the fianc6 and provide a fair chance for a response,
rather than accuse him behind his back. The court's opinion seems to
presume that the results would have been the same. Therein lies the flawed
reasoning. This concept flies in the face of centuries old tradition and
experience of adversarial jurisprudence. That tradition holds as its
fundamental principle that justice is best served when all sides have their
say. Instead, Florida's high court allowed the defendant to point the finger
of blame away from itself. It simultaneously placed the burden of suing all
potentially liable entities upon the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff does not

29. See generallyFabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) (reviewing Fabre1, 597
So. 2d at 883).
30. Id. at 1183-84.
31. Id. at 1184-85.
32. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1975).
33. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185 (analyzing Disney, 515 So. 2d at 198).
34. Disney, 515 So. 2d at 201 (assessing Disney 86% of damages despite jury findings
of non-party fianc6's 85% fault).
35. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (Supp. 1986).
36. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
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believe those entities are liable. This requirement raises ethical concerns for
plaintiff's counsel.
Interestingly, the Fabrecourt bolstered its position by saying that even
if the statute was ambiguous, "[we] believe that the legislature intended that
damages be apportioned among all participants to the accident."37 But the
court provided no basis for reaching that conclusion, such as references to
legislative hearings or committee meetings. There was no legislative
directive that the statute should be liberally construed to limit a defendant's
liability. There was no reference to support further constriction of the joint
and several doctrine beyond what the legislature had already done.
The court did make reference to a seven-year-old legislative finding
which states the reasons why the legislature wanted comprehensive tort
reform and would enact such reform themselves." It would seem, then,
that the court should not have added to or expanded the statute. Nevertheless, the law today is as follows: Any entity who is potentially liable may
be blamed by a named defendant and may be placed on the verdict form for
apportionment of liability, without being made a party to the lawsuit.
The supreme court's holding forces plaintiffs and their counsel into a
conflict between themselves. For example, plaintiff's counsel is ethically
bound to name only those defendants whom he or she believes in good faith
to be liable, yet the Fabre decision by the Supreme Court of Florida forces
counsel to name all potential entities the defense may use to avoid or reduce
its own responsibility. As a result, plaintiff is forced to sue entities he or
she may not believe liable. There is no doubt that the legislature has the
right and the power to modify or eliminate joint and several liability.
Likewise, it has the ability to prescribe apportionment among entities who
are not parties to the lawsuit. And of course, the supreme court has the
power to do as it did in Fabre. But where the legislature has expressly
addressed the issue to the extent it thought necessary, the question is not
whether the court could, but whether it should, expand the legislation
beyond its strict meaning.
II. SURVEY OF FLORIDA CASES BETWEEN
JULY, 1994 AND JULY, 1995
Florida courts have repeatedly confronted Fabre/Messmerparty liability
issues since the final disposition of the cases. The remainder of this article

37. Fabre,623 So. 2d at 1185.
38. Il (citing Tort Reform Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws 695,
699 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Supp. 1986)).
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surveys post Fabre/Messmercases, focusing on the Fabre/Messmerissue of
liability in each case and, perhaps, gives insight into the future of Florida
decisions.
A. First District Court of Appeal
In Department of Corrections v. McGhee,39 two felons escaped from
the custody of the Department of Corrections ("DOC") while being taken to
a doctor for an eye examination. The escapees fled from Florida to
Alabama and then to Mississippi, where they later shot plaintiff's husband,
a park ranger. Suit was filed against the DOC, alleging that the agency was
negligent in its care, supervision and control of the felons and that, as a
result of such negligence, the inmates escaped and thereafter caused the
death of Robert McGhee, Jr., plaintiff's husband."n
The Fabre/Messmerissue in this case was whether the jury should be
permitted to apportion noneconomic damages between negligent and
intentional tortfeasors. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge
Ervin also discussed pertinent aspects of section 768.81 of the Florida
Statutes.4' He specifically pointed to the language of section 768.81(4):
(b) The section does not apply to any action brought by any person to
recover actual economic damages resulting from pollution, to any action
based upon an intentional tort, or to any cause of action as to which
application of the doctrine of joint and several liability is specifically
provided by chapter 403, chapter 498, chapter 517, chapter 542, or
chapter 895.42
Judge Ervin notes that the DOC argued in the trial court that the felons,
who were not named defendants, were partially at fault based upon their
intentional and criminal conduct and, therefore, the jury should consider the
various percentages of fault of all tortfeasors.43 Mrs. McGhee took the
position that DOC's claim for apportionment was barred by the provisions
of section 768.81(4)(b) of the FloridaStatutes since the felons committed
intentional acts."4

39. 653 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Ervin J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 1091-92.
41. Id. at 1099-1101; see generally FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1993).
42. McGhee, 653 So. 2d at 1099-1100 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.81(4)(a) (1989)).
43. Id. at 1100.
44. Id.
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Judge Ervin reasoned, agreeing with the decision of the trial court, that
since plaintiff's action against the DOC was based on negligence, plaintiff's
argument must fail.45 He specifically noted that, "[n]o action was brought
by appellee on the theory of intentional tort. ' 4 6 Section 768.81 of the
FloridaStatutes requires a jury's consideration of each individual's "fault"
contributing to an injured person's damages even if such person is not or
cannot be a party to the lawsuit.47 According to Judge Ervin:
I consider that the comparative fault statute, in precluding the comparing of fault in any action based upon intentional fault, expressed an
intent to retain the common law rule forbidding an intentional tortfeasor
from reducing his or her liability by the partial negligence of the
plaintiff in an action based on intentional tort. However, such exclusion
has no applicability to an action, such as that at bar, based solely on
negligence, and, consequently, the fault of both negligent and intentional
tortfeasors may appropriately be apportioned as a means of fairly
distributing the loss according to the percentage of fault of each party
48
contributing to the loss. I would therefore affirm as to this issue.
Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc. v. Nash,49 involved a plaintiff,
Lucille Nash, who was robbed and pistol-whipped in the parking garage of
Methodist Hospital in Jacksonville.' She sued defendant, a security guard
service, for negligence. The Fabre/Messmerissue dealt with the verdict
form. Defendant, Wells Fargo, moved to include the hospital, a non-party,
on the verdict form. The trial court denied defendant's motion and the case
was submitted to the jury with only the defendant appearing on the verdict
form.5'
In this decision, the First District Court of Appeal, following Fabre,
held that the case must be reversed and that the hospital, a non-party, must
be included on the verdict form, even though Nash had not included the
hospital in the suit.52 There was no discussion in this decision of the
extent to which there was any "evidence" of fault on the part of the hospital.

45. l at 1101.

46. IaU
47. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1989).
48. McGhee, 653 So. 2d at 1101.
49. 654 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

50. IUt at 156.
51. It
52. Id.
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Second District Court of Appeal

In Peterson v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Ass'n, Inc.," a wrongful
death suit was filed alleging medical malpractice against a hospital and two
of its employees, a nurse and a nurse midwife.54 A Dr. Keller, who
specialized in obstetrics and gynecology, was also a defendant. Before trial,
Dr. Keller reached an informal settlement with no documentation. Plaintiff
unsuccessfully moved in limine to exclude any evidence of the $250,000
settlement, and both the fact of the settlement and the amount of the
settlement were disclosed to the jury during the trial.55 Defense counsel
stated in final argument:
[T]hey have already received or will receive funds from Dr. Keller.
When you couple that with the amount that they've received or are
receiving from the government, it more than equals the amount of
money [the plaintiffs' attorney] has asked you for for [sic] care and
services. More, greater than. 6
Later, the trial court instructed the jury that Dr. Keller had settled and
the hospital was blameless for his actions. However, the court instructed the
jury it could still assign Dr. Keller a percentage of liability regardless of any
insurance coverage. The jury then returned a verdict for the hospital and its
two nurses.57
The court treated Dr. Keller in this instance as a Fabre party.
Nevertheless, the District Court of Appeal reversed this verdict and
remanded the case for a new trial holding that the disclosure of the amount
of the settlement clearly prejudiced the plaintiffs in this case." "Inmany
respects, the trial court allowed the defendants to treat Dr. Keller as both a
party who had settled and as one who had not."59
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Baione,60 a wrongful death action, Baione's
estate brought an action for damages against the manufacturer of asbestos
products. The suit claimed that Baione's death was caused by his exposure
The
to asbestos products during the course of his employment.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

656 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id.
Peterson, 656 So. 2d at 501.
Id. at 503.
642 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
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Fabre/Messmerissue in this case was whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to permit the apportionment of fault against non-parties to the suit,
other manufacturers of the asbestos. The Second District Court of Appeal
held that the evidence was insufficient and, therefore, the trial court judge
correctly denied the manufacturer's request to have the jury make assessments of fault of non-party entities. 1
In Seminole Gulf Railway, Ltd. v. Fassnacht,62 plaintiffs, a retired
couple, suffered injuries when their vehicle, driven by the husband, collided
with defendant's train.63 Plaintiffs brought a negligence suit and a suit for
personal injury damages against the owner of the Seminole Gulf Railway.
The jury verdict form directed the jury to consider the liability of defendant
Seminole, the liability of the plaintiff husband, and the amount of
noneconomic damages, if any. The jury found defendant and the plaintiff
husband each 50% negligent and awarded plaintiffs $35,000 each for past
and future noneconomic damages. 64
Relying on section 768.81(3) of the FloridaStatutes, Seminole moved
to have Mrs. Fassnacht's award reduced by Mr. Fassnacht's percentage of
comparative fault.6" The Second District Court of Appeal ultimately held
that Seminole's position was correct in accordance with the holding of
Fabre and directed Mrs. Fassnacht's award be accordingly reduced.66
It should be noted that in a partially concurring and partially dissenting
opinion, Judge Altenbemd concluded that the Fabre/Messmerissue had not
been adequately preserved by the defendant in trial court. 67 Judge Altenbemd stated:
The record does not reflect that the defendant asked for relief under
section 768.81 until after the jury returned its verdict. In my opinion,
a defendant should raise section 768.81 as an affirmative defense, just
as defendants have always raised contributory or comparative negligence. A defendant should request jury instructions on this issue
similar to the standard instructions for comparative negligence.... If
a defendant wants the benefit of section 768.81, the jury should be told

61. Il
62. 635 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Altenbemd, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
63. Id at 143.
64. Id
65. Id at 144; see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1989).
66. Seminole Gulf, 635 So. 2d at 144.

67. Id
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about the effect that statute will have on its verdict, just as it is told
about the effect of traditional comparative negligence.6
On a further review of the apportionment of damages issue, Judge
Altenbernd noted that the majority's opinion awarded Mrs. Fassnacht only
$17,500 since section 768.81(5) of the FloridaStatutes does not apply to
cases with damages of $25,000 or less. 69 Ironically, the plaintiff's recovery
was smaller due to the larger jury award. Judge Altenbermd noted:
[t]his result may seem logical and fair to the legislature, but I doubt it
is the result that most jurors would anticipate. In assessing damages,
a jury should have a general understanding of the overall ramifications
of its verdict. This jury had no reason to anticipate that Mrs. Fassnacht's award would be 50% of what they actually awarded.7"

C.

Third District Court of Appeal

The wrongful death action in Chesterton v. Fisher,7 1 involved a
plaintiff who died of mesothelioma, an asbestos-related cancer, and the
defendants, manufacturers and sellers of packing and gasket materials.
Plaintiffs previously settled with approximately twenty-six manufacturers of
asbestos-containing insulation. Although this case was reversed and sent
back for a new trial on other grounds,72 the court mentioned that Fabre
was decided subsequent to the first trial.73 The Third District Court of
Appeal wrote:
[a]t the time of trial, the trial court did not have the benefit of the
Therefore,
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Fabre v. Marin ....
on remand if there is sufficient "evidence to consider the liability of
other nonparties," the jury is to be instructed pursuant to Section
768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and provided with jury instructions
and a verdict form that permits the jury to apportion liability among all
alleged tortfeasors. 74

68. Id.
69. Id. at 145; see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5) (1989).

70. Seminole Gulf, 635 So. 2d at 145.
71. 655 Fla. 2d 170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
72. Id. at 171.
73. Id. at 172.
74. Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Dougherty, 636 So. 2d 746, 748 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
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In City of Homestead v. Martins,75 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the amount of a judgment against a defendant hospital could not
exceed the percentage of liability apportioned against it by the jury.76 The
court held that pursuant to Fabre,it was error for the trial court to award an
amount that exceeded the percentage of liability attributed to it by the jury.
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Ashraf v. Smith,77 a medical
malpractice case, followed Fabre by holding that a defendant physician's
request to include a non-party hospital on the verdict form should have been
granted.78 The court ruled that if, at retrial, the jury determined the
hospital was not a negligent cause of the plaintiff's death, then the original
judgment against the defendant physician and the physician's protective trust
fund would be reinstated.79
In Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera,' ° the wife of a man killed from
an elevator shaft fall brought an action against the elevator maintenance
company and Dade County, the elevator owner. The plaintiff privately
settled with Dade County and went to trial against the elevator company.
The elevator company, Schindler, requested that Dade County be listed on
the verdict form for apportioning liability. The trial court denied the request
and the jury only considered the liability of the elevator company and the
deceased. The jury entered a verdict finding the elevator company 75% at
fault and the decedent 25% at fault. On appeal, the Third District Court of
Appeal held that reversal was required under Fabre and the jury should
apportion liability among "all persons responsible for the accident,"'"
including Dade County.
D. Fourth District Court of Appeal
The plaintiff in Yablon v. North River Insurance Co., 2 was injured
in a car wreck. She and her husband privately settled with two tortfeasors,
Ford Motor Company and Pompano Lincoln Mercury. At the time of the
crash, plaintiff had insurance with North River, under a policy which
contained benefits for uninsured/underinsured coverage. The policy
provided that uninsured motorist ("UM") benefits would not apply if there
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

645 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Id.
647 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.at 893.

IM
644 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id at 564.
654 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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was a settlement "without our consent." 3 Due to the settlements without
the UM carrier's "consent," the lower court held, in a declaratory judgment
action, that there was no UM coverage.84 The crux of the case was really
whether or not the nonconsensual settlement with these tortfeasors had
somehow "prejudiced" the UM carrier.85 In this instance, the appellate
court held that plaintiffs had made a requisite showing of lack of prejudice
to defeat coverage based, at least in part, on the Fabre decision.8 6 With
the abrogation of joint and several liability, North River would not be
compromised by private settlements. They would still only be liable for
their percentage share of liability.87 Accordingly, the finding of "no
coverage" was reversed.88
With regard to our discussion of Fabre/Messmerissues, Brown v. City
of Lauderhill89 assists us only in that it provides a further definition of a
"party" under section 768.81(3) of the FloridaStatutes. The court here was
simply trying to determine whether or not a city is a real party in interest to
various attorney's fee claims. The court noted that "often the term 'party'
is recognized as including those who are real parties in interest." 90
In Bell South Human Resources Administration, Inc. v. Colatarci,9 1 a
Southern Bell employee was injured while participating in a physical
activities program sued the corporation operating the program for damages.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred in failing to include
nonparty tortfeasors on the verdict form. Following Fabre, the court
decided that failure to include nonparty tortfeasors on a verdict form
required reversal of the plaintiff's verdict in this personal injury case despite
plaintiffs contention that the defendant's proffer did not show sufficient
evidence of negligence by nonparties. 2
In East West Karate Ass'n, Inc. v. Riquelme,93 a karate student who
ruptured his spleen brought a negligence action against a karate association.
On appeal, the karate association claimed that the trial court erred by not
including the sparring partner's name to the jury on the verdict form.
83. Id. at 1034.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
See id. at 1035.
Id.
Yablon, 654 So. 2d at 1035.
Id. at 1036.
654 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 303 (citing Fabre, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) as an example).
641 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 428.
638 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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Following Fabre, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed
the case.94
E. Fifth District Court of Appeal
The plaintiff in Wet 'n Wild Florida, Inc. v. Sullivan,9 was injured
while pulling a drowning woman from a "wave pool." The complaint
alleged negligence on the part of the lifeguard employees of defendant Wet
'n Wild. According to the plaintiff, if the employees had rescued the
victim, the plaintiff would not have been injured. Wet 'n Wild took the
position "that it had not breached any duty owed to Sullivan and that
Sullivan was herself negligent and that the victim was negligent."9 6 The
Fabre/Messmerissue noted in this case was whether or not the trial court
erred in not submitting the issue of the victim's negligence to the jury for
its consideration. 97 The court decided that the jury should consider, and
apportion accordingly, the relative negligence of all parties, including the
drowning victim.9'
A car wreck led plaintiff to sue in DeWitt Excavating, Inc. v. Walters.99 In 1988, a DeWitt employee negligently directed Hashim to turn
into the path of Walters' oncoming vehicle. Plaintiff Walters settled
privately with Hashim and went to trial against DeWitt Excavating. The
jury found the remaining defendant, DeWitt Excavating, 25% negligent.
Consequently, DeWitt was held liable for the first $25,000 in damages and
for 25% of the excess, after subtracting the settlement amount."° The jury
found Hashim 75% negligent and plaintiff 0% negligent. 0 1
The case was reversed and remanded holding that once damages exceed
$25,000, the doctrine of joint and several liability is inapplicable to the
action and, thus, a nonsettling defendant is responsible for only that portion
of the entire noneconomic damages equivalent to the percentage of

at 605.
94. Id.
95. 655 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App 1995).
96. Id. at 1172.
97. See id. at 1174.
98. Id.
99. 642 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
100. Id. at 834.
101. Id. at 833.
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fault."0 2 Therefore the defendant was not jointly and severally liable for
the first $25,000 in damages.'0 3
° deals primarily
Turner v. Gallagher'O
with the 120-day service rule
regarding service of a summons and complaint and whether or not the 120day rule applies to the Department of Insurance in a sovereign immunity
case. Here, the court looks to Messmer for guidance in defining the term
cc1105'dfnatmena
party.
Further, "the term 'defendant' unambiguously means a party
named in a lawsuit against whom some type of relief or recovery is sought
or who claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff."'" The court held that
the rule requiring service of process upon a defendant within 120 days after
the filing of the initial pleading does not apply to the Department of
Insurance in a negligence action/sovereign immunity action under the statute
requiring service of process upon the Department of Insurance.'0 7
F. Supreme Court of Florida
In the Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center,
° decision,
Inc.,'O
considered by many legal scholars to be the most
instructive, informative and well-reasoned decision on the Fabre/Messmer
issue, the Supreme Court of Florida favorably resolved the confusion and
conflict surrounding the treatment of liability settlements and setoffs after
Fabre. This case involved a medical malpractice action in which the
claimant settled before trial with defendant doctors for $300,000 and later
went to trial against the defendant hospital. The jury determined claimant's
total damages at approximately $575,000 and apportioned 90% of the fault
to the hospital. The trial court denied the hospital's motion for a reduction
in the judgment based upon the $300,000 already paid by the settling defendants." ° The hospital appealed the trial court's decision and the First
District Court of Appeal reversed, citing footnote three in Fabre and

102. Id. at 834.
103. See id. The opinion provides a step-by-step review of how to determine a damages
award in similar situations. DeWitt, 642 So. 2d at 834-35.
104. 640 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
105. Id. at 121. The Messmer court noted that "party" is a non-limiting term. Id.
(citing Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611).
106. Turner, 640 So. 2d at 121 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) and Messmer, 588 So.
2d at 610).
107. Id.
108. 20 Fla. L. Weekly S278 (June 15, 1995).
109. Id.
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deviating from conflicting portions."' The First District Court of Appeal
certified the following questions to the Supreme Court of Florida:
(A) IS A NONSETILING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED
UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR REDUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAGES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED
UPON SUMS PAID BY SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS
OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY
THE JURY?
(B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO
BOTH ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC DAMAGES?'"
Both certified questions were answered in the negative."'
In a decision authored by Chief Justice Grimes and concurred with by
every other justice, the court held that the setoff statutes apply only to
damages for which the parties are jointly and severally liable."' They do
not apply to damages for which there is only proportional liability.
Accordingly, there is no setoff for any portion of a settlement attributable
to noneconomic damages." 4
The allocation of settlement proceeds
between economic and noneconomic damages must be determined by the
respective percentages ultimately fixed by the jury.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Wells and Kogan noted that
this issue is but one of many problems arising from the Fabre decision and
called for a reexamination of Fabre."5 In another concurring opinion,
Justice Anstead expressed his concern that the legislature had not acted to
6
clear up these problems."
Il.

CONCLUSION

At one point in time in the not-too-distant past history of tort law, any
amount of contributory negligence completely barred a plaintiff's claim. As
a result of the extreme harshness of this concept, the doctrine of joint and

110. Id. at S280 (citing Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1186 n.3).
111. Id. at S278.
112. Id.
113. See Wells, 20 Fla. L. Weekly at S279.

114. IL at S280.
115. See id. at S281 (Wells, J., and Kogan, J., concurring).
116. See id. (Anstead, J., concurring).
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several liability developed slowly throughout the country. The theory of
joint and several liability allows the plaintiff to collect the full amount of
damages from any tortfeasor who caused the plaintiff's injuries. Members
of the Florida Bar Association during these years discussed whether the
doctrine of joint and several liability caused inequities. The matter was a
choice: If there had to be a loss, the question was whether the loss should
be borne by the guilt-free victim or by the wrongdoing tortfeasor. The
obvious answer and the one uniformly chosen by the courts was that the
cost should be borne by the parties sharing responsibility for the injury.
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, statutes and case law
developed the concept of comparative negligence. Replacing contributory
negligence with comparative negligence eliminated what had been an
illogical and antiquated bar to compensation. Eventually, defendants began
to argue that the doctrine of comparative negligence was logically inconsistent with the common law doctrine of joint and several liability. In Florida,
the doctrine of joint and several liability was retained. This was so until the
enactment of the 1986 Tort Reform Act and subsequent interpretations of
that Act, including the decision in Fabre. The Fabre case represents a
policy decision that losses resulting from negligence of unknown or
uninsured tortfeasors should be borne by the injured plaintiff, even when
that plaintiff may be totally free from any fault or wrongdoing. Such a
policy is abhorrent to the fundamentals of our system of justice.
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